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Performance post succession on Italian family farms 
 
Abstract 
We analyse whether the event of succession changes the performance of Italian family farms, using data from the Italian 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and several performance indicators during 2008-2014. T-tests of equality of 
means and propensity score matching reveal that succession has a negative effect on performance related to capital, due 
to an increase in capital after succession. Furthermore, in the first years examined, performance per hectare after succession 
is lower for farms with succession than for farms without. This negative effect of succession on performance per hectare 
is not systematically confirmed when performance is related per labour unit.  
Keywords: family farms; succession; performance; propensity score matching; Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
Farm transfers are a key component of structural change in the farming sector. However, in the 
European Union (EU), according to the European Commission (2012) the transfer of farms to younger 
generation is too low. It is recognised that new farmers bring innovation and dynamism (Calus et al., 
2008; European Commission, 2012). The transfer of farms from retiring farmers to new entrants, in 
particular young ones, rather than the farms’ dismantling to enlarge existing farms, is therefore crucial 
for maintaining the competitiveness of the sector. However, another condition is that after succession, 
the farm survives and thrives. Performance is a key element of farm survival. Zhengfei and Oude 
Lansink (2006) suggested that farm performance decreases during the adjustment period of the newly 
settled farmers, where the latter indebt themselves and invest to expand. However, some actions aimed 
at developing the farm and improving the performance, taken by the retiring farmer before transfer, 
may not only make the farm more attractive for successors (Lobley and Baker, 2012; Cavicchioli et 
al., 2015), it may also ensure the viability of the farm (Wheeler et al., 2012). Some authors confirmed 
that farm assets level and farm investments are influenced by the succession process, the soon-to-
retire farmers may indeed implement some investments to prepare succession. This is what Kimhi et 
al. (1995) (quoted by Diwisch et al., 2009) called the ‘shadow of succession’. For example, Gate and 
Latruffe (2015) reported, for their sample of French soon-to-retire farmers in Brittany (Western 
France) that many of them invested on their farm to develop it in a view of improving its performance 
after succession had taken place. Calus et al. (2008), Mishra and El-Osta (2008) and Potter and Lobley 
(1996) argued that farm investments increase when a farm successor is identified, even though the 
causality nexus between investments and the presence of a successor is not clear-cut and should be 
better clarified. In fact, it is uncertain whether the increase in farm investments occurs in preparation 
of the incoming succession (the designated successor may be involved in farm management before 
the official farm transfer), or whether succession is more likely to occur on thriving farms with a 
higher level of investments. For Mann et al. (2013) dismantling farm investments is a clear signal of 
farmer’s retirement without succession, while Kazukauskas et al. (2013) considered disinvestments 
as a proxy for farm exit. 
The impact of succession on performance has not been systematically studied, though some researches 
have addressed contiguous issues. For example, Carillo et al. (2013) evaluated the difference in 
economic performance between inherited and non-inherited farms using cross sectional data from a 
sample of 11,000 Italian farms. Their results show that inherited farms tend to under-perform with 
respect to non-inherited farms. However, this work is not strictly focused on evaluating the effect of 
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farm succession, and mainly represents a performance comparison between two modalities of farm 
succession. Furthermore, the use of cross-sectional data does not allow to evaluate the time effect of 
farm succession, and the information about the time elapsed from the succession event is not available. 
Laband and Lentz (1983) found the opposite result with inherited farms over-performing with respect 
to the non-inherited ones. Other studies found a direct relationship between the probability of 
succession and farm economic performance (Kerbler, 2008, Mishra and El-Osta, 2008; Glauben et al., 
2009; Corsi, 2009; Cavicchioli et al., 2015; Bertoni and Cavicchioli, 2016). Moreover, the presence 
of a successor tends to influence future farm strategies. Generally, younger farmers are more oriented 
toward a diversification of farm activities and a conversion to more sustainable agricultural practices 
(Zagata and Sutherland, 2010). Farms diversifying and converting toward sustainable farming 
methods are expected to be more appealing for a potential successor (Sottomayor et al., 2011; 
Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Suess-Reyes and Fuetsch, 2016). In the non-agricultural sector, Diwisch 
et al. (2009) analysed the effect of succession on the growth of firms in Austria and found that 
succession had a significant positive effect on employment growth. Several studies have investigated 
the effect of a change in chief executive officer (CEO) on firms’ performance and reported mixed 
findings (see the review in Karaevli, 2007). Other authors studied the link between succession and 
performance for firms, but comparing the performance of firms for which management was kept by 
family heirs (intra-family succession) and of firms for which management was transferred to managers 
outside the family. Some authors reported a lower performance of firms with intra-family succession 
compared to firms with extra-family succession (e.g. Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Wennberg et al., 
2011). 
In this context our paper aims at investigating the impact of succession on performance in Italy. 
According to Eurostat, in 2013 Italy counted about 1 million of farms, corresponding to 9.3% of EU-
28 farms. The average physical dimension of Italian farms is about 25% lower than the European one, 
with only 12 hectares (ha) of utilised agricultural area (UAA) per farm. The same holds for the average 
labour dimension, that limits to 0.8 annual working unit (AWU) (i.e. full time equivalent workers) per 
farm. On the opposite, the standard output1 per farm is 41% above the EU-28 average, while the 
standard output per AWU is 54% above average. Nevertheless, the Italian farming sector productivity 
is not comparable with other economic sectors; in fact, for example, the agricultural value added per 
worker is 33.5% lower than the industrial sector’s one and 38% less with respect to trade and services 
sector’s workers. An important part of the Italian farms are operated as family farms, where the 
farmer’s household is directly engaged in the farm business management. In fact, in 2013 a high share 
of 77.4% of farm labour came from farm household members. In 2010 the share of farms where 
children of the farm holder worked on the farm was only 17.3%. The ratio between the number of 
children aged between 20 and 40 working on the farm, and the number of farm holders, was only 
15.8%. For each child aged between 20 and 40 working on the farm, there were 2.2 members of the 
same category not working on the farm. 
The Italian farming sector is not young: about 40% of Italian farms were managed by a farmer of 65 
years or older; such share is considerably higher than the EU-28 one (31%). On the opposite, farmers 
less than 35 years old were only 4.5% (6% in the EU-28). With an average UAA of only 65.5% of the 
national average, farms managed by the eldest farmers are generally smaller than other farms. 
Similarly, their standard output per farm amounts to only 55% of the national average. The picture 
regarding farmer’s education is not glossy: in 2010 less than 30% of Italian farmers had a secondary 
school diploma at least, while only 6% had a degree. In farms managed by a farmer of 65 years or 
older these figures fall respectively to 11.5% and 3.6%. Hence, when farms are transferred, there is 
an opportunity to improve farm performance by bringing ‘fresh blood’ from younger and more 
educated farmers. The link between farm succession and farm performance has not been studied so 
                                                          
1
 According to the European Commission Regulation 1242/2008, standard output is the average monetary value at farm-
gate price of each agricultural product in a given region. At farm level the standard output of each product is calculated 
by multiplying the number of hectares of crops or heads of livestock by their specific regional standard output, while the 
total farm standard output is calculated by summing the standard output of each product. 
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far. The main reason may be the lack of data: firstly, the same farms need to be observed for enough 
a long period, and secondly the event of success is rarely informed. Here we analyse whether the event 
of succession changes the performance of farms, for the case of Italian family farms during the period 
2008-2014. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the data used and the methodology. 
Section 3 describes the farms and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and methodology 
Our analysis uses data from the national Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) Italian database 
over the period 2008-2014. This is an annual accountancy database for commercial farms that are 
representative of regional productions and that have a minimum economic size. The database is an 
unbalanced panel sample, with the farm rotating rate within the database being about 16%. Only 
family farms are considered in this study. They are selected on the basis of the FADN variable defining 
the management type, and consist in farms managed by family members, with three possible types: 
farms with family members only; farms with a prevalence of family members; farms with a prevalence 
of hired workers. Among the family farms only those having only one farm holder have been selected, 
as the only way to identify the succession is the change in birth age of the farmer. In addition, we 
removed farms with aberrant data, namely zero labour, zero or negative capital, and or negative value 
of total output. The full sample includes 3,163 family farms observed each year during 2008-2014. 
Farm succession is not recorded in the FADN database. Hence, here an event of succession is 
identified based on managers’ age differences between years. We consider that farms with no 
succession are those for which the age of the manager increases by one year every year during 2008-
2014. By contrast, a succession is said to have occurred on a farm between year t and year t+1 if the 
age of the manager in t+1 was at least 20 years greater than the age of the manager in t. We removed 
farms for which the change in managers’ age was more than one year but for which the age has 
decreased by less than 20 years old (very young entrants) or for which the age has increased (new 
entrants older than exiting farmers). We only kept farms which remained family farms during the 
whole period. Farms which changed their status to non-family farms following succession were not 
considered here. Table 1 shows the final balanced sample used in this study: 3,114 farms, including 
2,982 farms where no succession occurred during the period (the ‘farms without succession’) and 132 
farms where one (and only one) succession occurred during the period (the ‘farms with succession’). 
Most of the successions took place in 2011(29.5%) and in 2012 (25%). 
  
Table 1: Number of family farms in the sample used observed each year during 2008-2014 
 Number of farms Share of farms 
All farms, including: 3,114 100% 
Farms without succession 2,982 95.8% 
Farms with succession 132 4.2% 
Farms with succession, including: 132 100% 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2009 10 7.6 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2010 21 15.9 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2011 39 29.5 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2012 15 11.4 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2013 33 25.0 
Farms for which succession occurred in 2014 14 10.6 
Source: the authors based on Italian FADN data 
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In the following, performance is compared across farms with the following proxies: 
i. Total revenue: it includes the value of total output, the subsidies and other revenues; 
ii. Total costs: they include all costs occurred by the farms, namely production costs (see below), 
long term costs (see below), the costs of external factors (see below), interest and other expenses; 
iii. Total output: this is the value of output, including the output sold, the output stocked and the 
output self-consumed; 
iv. Total subsidies: these are the value of subsidies received by the farms, including operational 
subsidies and investment subsidies, originating from regional, national and European sources; 
v. Production costs: they include intermediate consumption and other direct costs such as 
processing or selling costs; 
vi. Value added: this is calculated with total revenue minus production costs; 
vii. Long term costs: they consist in capital depreciation 
viii. Net output: this is calculated with value-added minus long term costs; 
ix. External factors’ costs: they include hired labour wages and land rentals; 
x. Operating income: this is calculated with net farm output minus external factors’ costs; 
xi. Net income: this is calculated with operating farm income minus interest and other expenses. 
In order to control for size, the performance proxies are to size variables. Since farms have various 
production orientations, there is no uniform size measure. For this reason, the eleven performance 
proxies are in turn to UAA, to labour and to capital. Thus, the performance indicators used are 
indicators per ha, per AWU and per unit of capital. 
We aim at assessing whether farm performance changes after succession. On the one hand, farm 
performance may be positively impacted by succession, as there may be an increase in performance 
due to the new impetus given by the entering farmer. On the other hand, farm performance may be 
negatively impacted by succession due to adjustments of the new farmer on the farm. To test which 
hypothesis is valid and/or prevalent, we compare, for farms with succession, their performance before 
and after succession. In a first step this will be performed with t-tests of equality of means for the 
various performance indicators listed above. However, this approach does not assert with certainty 
that changes observed are due to the succession event. Changes may due to modifications in the 
economic environment: these modifications are then faced by all farms, including those where no 
succession happened. In addition, there may be selection effects, in the sense that farms with 
succession may present some specific characteristics and that the probability of succession may not 
be random. Hence, in order to better capture the effect of succession and to control for potential 
selection bias, propensity score matching (PSM) is employed here in a second step.  
PSM can help estimating causal treatment, that is to say the effect of a treatment of an agent on an 
outcome for this agent. The technique is popular in medical research where medical programmes are 
evaluated in experiments with a group of treated patients and a group of untreated patients. However, 
it has also been widely used in a variety of fields, to study the effect of a policy measure or of a 
decision of the agent on a specific outcome such as profitability or wage (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). In agriculture it has for example been used to study the effect of implementing direct selling 
on Italian farms’ profitability (Caracciolo et al., 2015), the effect of adopting organic technology on 
United States’ farms’ technical efficiency (Mayen et al., 2010), or the effect of agri-environment 
programmes on German farms’ input use and output (Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). One can also note, 
outside agriculture, the article by Diwisch et al. (2009) which studies the effect of Austrian family 
firms’ succession on their growth using PSM. In the PSM approach, since only the outcome under the 
treatment scenario is observed, the potential outcome in the no-treatment scenario is built 
counterfactually. For this, counterfactual outcomes are constructed with similar agents who do not 
participate in the programme. The similarity of agents is assessed on the basis of characteristics that 
are not affect by the treatment. The propensity score is the probability of participating in the treatment 
programme given these characteristics. It helps select agents with identical characteristics (except for 
the treatment) before comparing their outcome. Here several outcomes are studied, namely the various 
performance indicators listed above. The treatment is succession, that is to say we investigate the 
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causal effect of succession on performance. With PSM we compare (a) the performance of a farm 
after succession (that is to say between T and 2014, where T is the date where succession took place), 
with (b) the performance of a similar farm which experienced no succession during the period between 
T and 2014. The average treatment effect of the treated is then computed, showing the difference in 
the expected performances with and without succession for those farms where succession took place. 
3. Farms’ description 
Table 2 describes the sample and compares the sub-samples (farms without succession vs. farms with 
succession) during the full period (i.e. including the periods before and after succession for farms with 
succession). The sample farms operated on average 27.1 ha of UAA and used 1.7 AWU of labour. 
They rented in on average 33.8% of their land and 11.3% of their labour force was hired. They received 
on average 490 Euros per ha of UAA, equivalent to 8.2 thousand Euros per AWU. They were mostly 
specialised in horticulture, field crops and grazing livestock (31.2%, 23.4% and 21.9% of the sample 
respectively). Half of them were located in less favoured areas (LFA) and 21.9% in mountainous 
areas. Comparing the sub-samples show that farms on which succession occurred were larger in terms 
of land, labour, capital and value of output produced (e.g. 35.4 ha of UAA on average vs. 26.7 ha for 
farms without succession) during the total period 2008-2014, and resorted less to rented in land. The 
sub-sample of farms with succession counts less field crop and horticulture specialised farms, but 
more grazing livestock and mixed cropping specialised farms, than farms without succession. It also 
counts more farms with a female head, more organic farms, more farms with other gainful activities 
(such as processing, selling, tourism, catering) and less farms localised in mountainous areas, than 
farms without succession. 
Before investigating how performance has changed for farms after succession took place on them, we 
study whether their structure has changed. Table 3 shows that, although size in terms of land, labour 
and output does not change in the period following succession compared the period before succession, 
the farm’s capital value largely increases (from 671.8 to 861.4 thousand Euros). This suggests that 
farmers taking over a farm implement investment so as to modernise the equipment, comply to 
standards or develop a new activity. This is confirmed by the subsidies received within the Rural 
Development Programme (RDP) of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): after succession, farms 
received much larger subsidies for investment aimed at farm modernisation or supporting young 
farmers setting up. The share of rented in land also increases (from 19.6% to 22.9%) after succession 
compared to before succession, suggesting that investments are not in land, but rather in equipment 
or machinery. As expected and conform with the way we identified farms where succession occurs, 
the age of the farm head decreases (from 69.8 to 22.9 years). A large number of women took over the 
farms, as the share of farms with female heads the year before succession occurred is 15.9% while the 
share in the next year (i.e. when succession occurred) is 23.5%. Finally, there is no highly significant 
change in terms of type of farming, in terms of organic or conventional production, and in terms of 
implementation of other gainful activities.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the family farm sample used (2008-2014) 
 All farms Farms without 
succession 
Farms with 
succession 
 
Number of farms 3,114 2,982 132  
 Mean in 
the period 
Min. Max. Mean in the 
period 
Mean in the 
period 
t-test of equality 
of means 
UAA (ha) 27.1 0.1 1,731.3 26.7 35.4 -2.7*** 
Labour (AWU) 1.7 0.05 51.2 1.7 1.8 -2.6*** 
Capital (ths Euros) 625.9 0.51 21,701.2 616.9 773.3 -3.1*** 
Total output (ths Euros) 107.3 0.15 7,189.7 105.6 147.4 -2.2** 
Share of rented in land (%) 33.8 0 100 34.4 21.8 11.2*** 
Share of hired labour (%) 11.3 0 100 11.2 12.5 -1.7* 
Age of the farm head (years) 54.6 19 92 54.6 54.2 -0.9 
 
Share of  
observations  
in the period 
Share of 
observations 
in the period 
Share of 
observations 
in the period 
Test of equality of 
proportions 
Farms with female head 17.8 17.6 21.3 -2.9*** 
Type of farming     
Field crops 23.4 23.6 17.1 4.6*** 
Horticulture 8.4 8.6 4.2 4.6*** 
Permanent crops 31.2 31.1 33.9 -1.8* 
Grazing livestock 21.9 21.6 29.2 -5.5*** 
Granivores 3.1 3.1 3.1 -0.02 
Mixed cropping 6.3 6.2 8.2 -2.5** 
Mixed livestock 0.7 0.7 1.0 -0.8 
Mixed crops-livestock 5.0 5.1 3.3 2.5** 
Organic farms 3.19 3.1 4.3 -2.0** 
Farms with other gainful 
activities 
27.4 27.0 35.6 -5.8*** 
In LFA 50.3 50.4 48.2 1.3 
In mountains 21.9 22.1 18.9 2.2** 
In regions     
North-West Italy 35.7 36.1 26.5 6.0*** 
North-East Italy 25.0 24.7 33.4 -6.0*** 
Central Italy 11.3 11.5 6.8 4.4*** 
Southern Italy 22.7 22.5 26.5 -2.8*** 
Islands 5.3 5.2 6.8 -2.2** 
Notes: The second part of the table report the share of farm-year observations and not the share of farms, as some farms may change 
their type after succession. The last column reports t-values and significance for the test with null hypothesis of means equality, and z-
values and significance for the test with null hypothesis of equality of shares (proportions). ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance 
respectively. AWU indicates annual working units (i.e. full-time equivalent workers). 
Source: the authors based on Italian FADN data 
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Table 3: Comparison of characteristics pre- and post-succession for those family farms which 
had a succession 
 Before 
succession: 
132 farms 
After 
succession: 
132 farms 
 
 Mean in the 
period 
Mean in the 
period 
t-test of equality 
of means 
UAA (ha) 35.7 34.9 0.3 
Labour (AWU) 1.8 1.8 1.0 
Capital (ths Euros) 671.8 861.4 -2.9*** 
Total output (ths Euros) 139.5 146.1 1.2 
Share of rented in land (%) 19.6 22.9 3.2*** 
Share of hired labour (%) 13.3 11.6 1.6 
Age of the farm head (years) 69.8 22.9 39.3*** 
CAP investment subsidies for farm modernisation    
per UAA (ths Euros/ha) 11.4 83.6 -2.0** 
per labour (ths Euros/AWU) 58.4 1,149.2 -2.3** 
per capital 0.00002 0.003 -2.5** 
CAP investment subsidies for young farmer setting up    
per UAA (ths Euros/ha) 8.2 108.6 -2.2** 
per labour (ths Euros/AWU) 84.6 956.0 -2.6** 
per capital 0.0008 0.003 -2.1** 
 
Share of farms 
in the year 
before 
succession 
Share of 
farms in the 
year of 
succession 
Test of equality 
of proportions 
Farms with female head 15.9 23.5 -1.5 
Type of farming    
Field crops 15.9 15.1 0.2 
Horticulture 4.5 4.5 0.0 
Permanent crops 33.3 31.8 0.3 
Grazing livestock 29.5 32.6 -0.5 
Granivores 3.0 3.0 0.0 
Mixed cropping 9.0 11.4 -0.6 
Mixed livestock 0.8 0.8 0.0 
Mixed crops-livestock 3.8 7.6 1.6* 
Organic farms 3.8 3.8 0.0 
Farms with other gainful activities 34.0 41.7 -1.3 
Notes: The second part of the table report the share of farm-year observations and not the change of farms, as some farms may change 
their type after succession. The last column reports t-values and significance for the test with null hypothesis of means equality, and z-
values and significance for the test with null hypothesis of equality of shares (proportions). ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance 
respectively. AWU indicates annual working units (i.e. full-time equivalent workers). 
Source: the authors based on Italian FADN data 
 
4. Results 
We investigate how performance changes for those farms who experienced succession. We firstly 
report the results from t-tests of equality of means on the performance pre- and post-succession for 
those farms which had a succession. Table 4 shows the t-tests results for the eleven performance 
proxies, related to land, labour and capital. Results indicate that after succession total revenue per ha 
increases on average (from 6,141.6 to 7,081.5 ths Euros) but so do total costs (from 3,059.9 to 3,505.1 
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ths Euros) and production costs. This could explain why the profit indicators (value added, net output, 
operating income, net income) do not significantly change after succession. When relating the 
performance proxies per labour, we can see that only the costs of external factors changes (it increases 
on average after succession compared to before succession) as well as the value of total subsidies (also 
increases). As for performance related to capital, they all decrease after succession, confirming that 
capital size has increased following succession. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of performance pre- and post-succession for those family farms which had 
a succession: results from t-tests of equality of means 
 Before 
succession: 
132 farms 
After 
succession: 
132 farms 
 
 Mean Mean t-test of equality of 
means 
Total revenue  per UAA (Euros/ha) 6,141.6 7,081.5 -1.7* 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 51,544.9 56,174.2 -1.5 
 per capital 0.201 0.154 3.1*** 
Total costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) 3,059.9 3,505.1 -2.0** 
per labour (Euros/AWU) 29,178.4 31,353.1 -1.1 
 per capital 0.116 0.088 2.5*** 
Total output  per UAA (Euros/ha) 5,825.6 6,524.6 -1.3 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 49,775.8 54,081.6 -1.5 
 per capital 0.194 0.147 3.1*** 
Total subsidies  per UAA (Euros/ha) 267.4 278.5 -1.0 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 4,771.5 5,870.5 -1.8* 
 per capital 0.015 0.012 2.0** 
Production costs per UAA (Euros/ha) 1,995.4 2,467.0 -3.1*** 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 20,847.0 23,401 -1.6 
 per capital 0.075 0.062 2.1** 
Value added  per UAA (Euros/ha) 4,146.1 4,614.5 -1.0 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 30;697.8 32,773.3 -1.0 
 per capital 0.126 0.092 3.2*** 
Long term costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) 543.2 509.5 1.3 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 4,486.7 4,082.9 1.3 
 per capital 0.015 0.012 4.4*** 
Net output  per UAA (Euros/ha) 3,602.9 4,105.0 -1.1 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 26,211.1 28,690.4 -1.2 
 per capital 0.111 0.081 2.9*** 
External factors’ costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) 660.1 749.5 -1.3 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 5,168 5,994.5 -2.2** 
 per capital 0.0305 0.020 1.7* 
Operating income  per UAA (Euros/ha) 2,942.9 3,355.5 -1.0 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 21,043.4 22,695.9 -0.8 
 per capital 0.081 0.061 3.1*** 
Net income  per UAA (Euros/ha) 2,988.0 3,401.7 -1.0 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) 22,423.4 24,603.4 -0.9 
 per capital 0.085 0.066 2.7*** 
Notes: The last column reports t-values and significance for the test with null hypothesis of means equality. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, 
10% significance respectively. AWU indicates annual working units (i.e. full-time equivalent workers). 
Source: the authors based on Italian FADN data 
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The above findings show changes between the period before succession and the period after 
succession but, as explained above, the changes may be due to other events than succession. In 
addition, there may be a selection bias for farms with succession. For this reason, the performance of 
farms after succession is compared to what could be the performance of these farms if no succession 
had taken place, using counterfactual farms and PSM. In a first step, farms with succession are 
matched with farms without succession that are identical (counterfactual farms). The matching is 
based on covariates, which are characteristics that do not change with the treatment (succession). 
Based on Table 3 showing that there are not many significant changes in the structure before and after 
succession, here we match farms based on their UAA, their labour, their share of hired labour, their 
type of farming, whether they have other gainful activities, as well as the region where they are 
located. The year is also added within the covariates so that a succession farm is matched with a no-
succession farm observed the same year. In a second step, the average treatment effect on the treated 
is calculated. This effect indicates by how much performance has been changed due to the succession 
event. 
Table 5 reports the average treatment effects on the treated for all eleven performance indicators, and 
depending on the period of observation (between T and 2014, T being the succession date). The first 
thing to note from the results is that not many indicators are significantly different between farms 
without succession and farms with succession when the latter took place in 2013 or in 2014, that is to 
say when succession was recent. For farms for which succession took place earlier, i.e. in 2009, 2010, 
2011 or 2012, total revenue per ha of UAA is lower on farms with succession than on farms without 
succession; however, total costs are also lower. Similarly, total output per ha of UAA is lower on 
farms with succession than on farms without succession; however, production costs are also lower. 
The negative effect of succession on revenue and also on costs confirm results obtained in section 4.1. 
In the latter, succession had no significant effect on profit indicators, due to the opposite effect on 
revenue and on costs. By contrast, with PSM we find that farms for which succession occurred in 
2009, 2010 and 2011 have a lower value added per ha and a lower net output per ha after succession, 
compared to similar farms in which succession did not take place. The negative effect of succession 
is also seen on operating income per ha and net income per ha but for farms for which succession took 
place in early dates, namely 2009 or 2010. The last thing to note is that performance proxies related 
to labour are in general not significantly different between farms with succession and farms without 
succession, but that performance proxies related to capital are almost all significantly lower in farms 
with succession, confirming that capital value has risen on these farms after succession. 
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Table 5: Comparison of performance of family farms which had a succession and family farms which had not succession: results from propensity 
score matching, average treatment effect on the treated 
 Succession in 
2009 
Succession in 
2010 
Succession 
in 2011 
Succession 
in 2012 
Succession 
in 2013 
Succession 
in 2014 
Total revenue  per UAA (Euros/ha) -4,293** -3,278*** -2,759** -2,669** -6,514 -442 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -7,142** -5,255 -4,972 -9,778** -14,201** -8,211 
 per capital -0.038*** -0.049*** -0.022*** -0.045*** -0.016* -0.040 
Total costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) -2,886** -1,889*** -1,671** -2,344*** -3,275 -423 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -5,400** -3,882* -3,886 -8,743*** -6,616* -9,439* 
 per capital -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.035*** -0.012 -0.034* 
Total output  per UAA (Euros/ha) -4,257** -3,397*** -2,848** -2,690** -6,462 -633 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -6,750** -5,314 -4,909 -9,286** -13,207** -8,487 
 per capital -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.024*** -0.044*** -0.013 -0.026* 
Total subsidies  per UAA (Euros/ha) 4.9 -7.0 -9.7 -8.4 -25.0 11.1 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -53 -405 -574 -534 -789 -620 
 per capital -0.003** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 
Production costs per UAA (Euros/ha) -1,832** -1,448*** -1,130** -1,849** -2,389 -472 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -3,394* -2,337 -2,869 -7,083** -5,583* -7,319* 
 per capital -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.010** -.0246*** -0.008 -0.026* 
Value added  per UAA (Euros/ha) -2,460*** -1,830*** -1,629* -821 -4,124 30 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -3,749* -2,919 -2,103 -2,695 -8,617* -892 
 per capital -0.020* -0.030*** -0.012* -0.020*** -0.008 -0.015 
Long term costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) -257** -151** -151 -76 -143 -180 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -935*** -528* -597* -404 -933* -1,790* 
 per capital -.00068*** -0.0024*** -0.0023** -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0040** 
Net output  per UAA (Euros/ha) -2,204*** -1,679*** -1,479* -744 -3,981 -210 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -2,813* -2,390 -1,507 -2,291 -7,685** 898 
 per capital -0.013** -0.027** -0.010** -0.020** -0.007 -0.011 
External factors’ costs  per UAA (Euros/ha) -821** -412*** -476*** -475*** -809 -18 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -672** -798** -282 -1,197*** -567 -49 
 per capital -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.004 -0.005 
Operating income  per UAA (Euros/ha) -1,383** -1,267** -1,003 -270 -3,172 -228 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -2,142 -1,593 -1,225 -1,094 -7,118** 849 
 per capital -0.002 -0.015*** -0.005 -0.010* -0.004 -0.006 
Net income  per UAA (Euros/ha) -1,262** -1,216** -961 -73 -2,943 634 
 per labour (Euros/AWU) -1,141 -775 -382 324 -4,746 2,861 
 per capital -0.0003 -0.0124*** -0.0016 -0.0053 0.0029 -0.0012 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance respectively. AWU indicates annual working units (i.e. full-time equivalent workers). 
Source: the authors based on Italian FADN data 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper analysed the effect of succession on farm performance, for a constant sample of family 
Italian farms in the Italian FADN database over the period 2008-2014. The analyses showed several 
findings. Firstly, the capital value has increased after succession, implying that all performance 
indicators related to capital are lower after succession than before succession, and are lower for farms 
with succession compared to farms without succession. Secondly, PSM revealed that, for farms with 
succession in the first years of the period considered, performance per ha of UAA after succession is 
lower for those farms than for farms in which no succession occurred. Thirdly, this negative effect of 
succession on performance per ha is not systematically confirmed when performance is related per 
labour. Fourthly, for farms with recent succession (in 2013 or 2014) there is not significant effect of 
succession on performance. 
This analysis is one of the rare contributions to the issue of how farms perform after succession. 
Findings could inform policy-makers on whether specific policies need to be targeted to retiring 
farmers a few years before transfer so as to ensure the farm’s viability post-succession. Our findings 
reveal that it depends which performance indicators is considered as most important by policy-makers, 
for example whether performance per ha or per unit of labour is deemed as crucial for the farm’s 
survival. One thing, however, that was clear from our analysis, is that the profit indicators do not 
increase following succession; at best, they do not change, at worst, they decrease. Analyses over a 
longer period are needed, as adjustments of the new farmer after succession may take time. Also, it 
would be preferable to investigate the issue per type of farming (e.g. dairy farms, field crop farms, 
etc.), but for this a bigger sample of farms with succession would be needed. 
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